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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This is a response to an appeal by Margret Aikhionbare from the judgment and 
conviction of Battery, a class B misdemeanor, in violation of Salt Lake City Code 
11.04.020, such judgment entered by Judge Robin Reese, Third District Court, Division 
II, on April 22, 1997. 
This Court obtains jurisdiction of this conviction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
Section 78-2a-3(2)(e). 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR APPEAL 
A. Issues. 
1. Whether the trial court committed error when allowing evidence in rebuttal of 
the defendant's witnesses. 
2 
2. Whether the defendant's trial counsel was ineffective for not objecting to the 
City's use of witnesses in rebuttal of the defendant's witnesses. 
3. Whether the evidence was sufficient to support Aikhionbare's conviction. 
B. Standards of Appellate Review. 
4. The issue of whether the trial court committed error when allowing evidence 
in rebuttal of the defendant's witnesses is a question of the conduct of a trial. 
Rule 611 of the Utah Rules of Evidence gives a trial judge broad control over 
the mode and manner in which testimony is offered- unless such discretion is 
abused the appellate court is required to affirm its exercise. See Russell v. 
Russell 852 P.2d 997 (Utah 1993). 
5. The ineffectiveness claim is a claim contingent upon the Court's review of 
whether the trial court committed error when allowing evidence in rebuttal of 
the defendant's witnesses. Should the Court reach this issue, to successfully 
press an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, a defendant must show that (i) 
counsel's performance was deficient in some demonstrable manner so as to 
fall below an objective standard of reasonable professional judgment, and (ii) 
there is a reasonable probability that but for the ineffective assistance, the 
result would have been more favorable to the defendant. See State v. Pascual, 
804 P.2d 553, 555 (Utah Ct. App. 1991).1 
6. The insufficiency of the evidence claim requires the defendant to marshal the 
facts to demonstrate that the evidence is legally insufficient even when viewed 
in the light most favorable to the verdict. See State v. Pilling, 875 P.2d 604, 
607-608 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). 
3 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from a judgment and conviction of the Appellant Margret 
Aikhionbare 1-; t .. > . Force or Violence Against tin Person ul Anolhei 
(Battery, SLC Code 11.08.020) following a bench trial, Judge Robin Reese presiding. 
The trial began on March 26. 1 y<;7, and was continued to April -._. . w , , when both 
parties completed their cases, and the trial court entered a verdict of guilty. 
Appellee Salt Lake City is otherwise satisfied with the Statement of the Case filed 
- . Bri:-f. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
\ . k * ». * * . f % r o 
object to the City's use of witnesses in rebuttal of her testimony and the testimony of her 
error by the trial court as the use of rebuttal witnesses in this fashion allowed the City to 
"twice present its case in C:.K: . .ic defendant finally argues that the evidence presented 
during the trial was insufficient to support a conviction. 
The trial court properly exercised control o\ er the mode and manner of the 
witnesses in accordance with the dictates of Rule 611 of the Utah Rules of Evidence. Hie 
witnesses called by the City in rebuttal to Aikhionbare's case in chief directly refuted the 
witnesses (the Defendant and her husband) called by the Defendant, and thus they were 
appropriate rebuttal witnesses. 
) 
and subsequent use of rebuttal witnesses (Don Okhomina and Officer Rich Blanchard) to 
1
 See also Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-696 (1984). 
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refute the testimony of the defendant Aikhionbare is an appropriate trial strategy. The 
purpose of this approach is to promote an efficient trial and properly conserve judicial 
resources. 
Trial counsel for Aikhionbare was effective in his defense of her. His failure to 
object to the City's use of rebuttal witnesses constitutes an appropriate professional 
judgment that this use of witnesses was proper. Additionally, the failure to object was 
consistent with his strategy of persuading the trial court that because of the conflicting 
testimony about the events of that day, a reasonable doubt existed as to his client's guilt 
of the use of unlawful force. 
There was ample evidence to support the conviction of Aikhionbare for the use of 
unlawful force or violence including the lack of injury to the Defendant to support her 
claim of self defense, the credible testimony of the victim Evelyn Okhomina, and the 
nature of the wound sustained by Ms. Okhomina which indicates an offensive wound. 
ARGUMENT 
I. The trial court's allowing the use of rebuttal witnesses by the City to refute the 
testimony of the Defendant Aikhionbare and her husband, Victor, was an 
appropriate decision by the court in its management of the trial. 
Governing standards of review 
A question as to the conduct of a trial, and more specifically, the mode and order 
of witnesses who testify is governed by Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 611, which states: 
(a) Control by court. The court shall exercise reasonable control over the mode 
and order of interrogating witnesses and presenting evidence so as to (1) make 
the interrogation and presentation effective for the ascertainment of the truth, (2) 
avoid needless consumption of time, and (3) protect witnesses from harassment or 
undue embarrassment. 
In Russell v. Russell, 852 P.2d 997, 999 (Utah 1993), the Supreme Court 
5 
held that Rule 611 gives a trial court broad control over the mode and manner in 
which testimony is offered, and unless such discretion is abused, the appellate 
courts are required to affirm its exercise.2 
The trial and key portions of testimony 
At trial, the City presented Evelyn Okhomina as the only witness in its 
case in chief. Ms. Okhomina testified much as is presented in Aikhionbare's brief 
on pages 6-8. Don Okhomina and Officer Rich Blanchard testified for the City 
following the defendant's witnesses. While their testimony does corroborate the 
victim Evelyn's statements, the purpose for which they testified was to refute or 
contradict the defense witnesses. 
The Defendant's Statement of the Facts may be summarized into key 
portions of testimony, particularly those establishing the elements of the crime of 
Battery ("Unlawful use of force or violence against the person of another."). By 
breaking the testimony into a key portion framework for analysis, the Court will 
find that contrary to the Defendant's assertions, the testimony of the City's 
rebuttal witnesses was rebuttal in nature- directly refuting the testimony of the 
Defendant's case. 
For example and related to the presence of Aikhionbare in the victim's 
home: the "victim" of the Battery, Evelyn Okhomina, testified that Aikhionbare 
and her husband were told not to come over to the Okhomina home and entered 
the home with the assistance of the young children (R.36-37). Aikhionbare and 
In Russell v. Russell, the court upheld the trial court who forced the parties to stipulate to an expert 
witness' testimony regarding a forgery by a party when the party had made an admission to having signed 
the relevant document. 
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her husband Victor, on the other hand, testified that both he and his wife were 
invited to the home to discuss issues related to an ethnic association (R.104). 
Following this testimony and in rebuttal, the City called Don Okhomina 
who refuted the Aikhionbares' statements of invitation directly (R.133-134). 
While this testimony had the indirect effect of corroborating Evelyn's testimony, 
it was offered in rebuttal of the Aikhionbares' statements. The effect of the 
testimony may have been to demonstrate the intent of the defendant as shown 
through her uninvited appearance at the Okhominas' home. 
A second example relates to the initiation of the confrontation, Evelyn 
Okhomina testified that Margret Aikhionbare began yelling loudly and using 
profanities, then came into the kitchen and threw a cooking pot against the wall 
(R. 40-42). Soon thereafter there was a physical encounter (R.46-48). 
By contrast during the defense case, Margret Aikhionbare testified, 
corroborated by her husband Victor's testimony, that Evelyn confronted her and 
said "Don't let me use this spoon to hit you and put pepper in your eye!" 
(R.73,90). At this point, the Aikhionbares say they left the home only to be 
pursued aggressively by Evelyn to the point of Evelyn dragging Margret into the 
apartment (R.75-78). 
Following this testimony and again in rebuttal, the City called Don 
Okhomina who countered that Margret had thrown the pot full of pasta against the 
wall, scaring the children, and then became physically aggressive. Additionally, 
he said he and Evelyn didn't have a spoon as described by the defense witnesses 
(R. 142-147). Again, the effect of Don Okhomina's testimony may have been 
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corroborative, but its intent and the purpose for which it was offered was to rebut 
Margret and Victor Aikhionbares' words. 
The final example of the City's use of witnesses to rebut defense 
witnesses' testimony is key and relates to the use of force or violence. Evelyn 
Okhomina testified that during a mutual struggle occasioned by Margret 
Aikhionbare attempting to re-enter her home, Aikhionbare pulled Evelyn's face to 
her and began to chew on her lip, causing chunks of flesh to be torn from her lip. 
This account was bolstered by City photographic exhibits that graphically 
portrayed the damage done (R.79-80). 
Both Margret and Victor testified that when Margret returned to the 
apartment to retrieve her purse, Evelyn attacked her and began to bite her fingers. 
Margret testified that she bit Evelyn's mouth to get her hand released, while 
Victor claimed that while he saw Evelyn bite Margret's fingers, he never saw 
Margret bite Evelyn's lip at all (R.105-109). 
The City called Don Okhomina whose testimony was consistent with that 
of his wife and contrary to that of the Aikhionbares. Additionally, he testified that 
not only had Victor viewed his wife biting Evelyn's lip, he encouraged her to do 
so for a significant length of time (R. 147). 
Definition of rebuttal evidence 
Aikhionbare cites a leading evidentiary treatise on the issue of the 
plaintiffs use of rebuttal witnesses: 
The Plaintiff is entitled to present his case in rebuttal. The plaintiff 
government may not at this stage present witnesses who merely lend 
support to the evidence originally presented as to the elements of the 
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offense.. .but is confined to testimony directed to refuting the defendant's 
evidence. 
It continues: 
The proper scope and function of rebuttal is thus refutation... (that which) 
denies, explains, qualifies, disproves, repels... 
(Graham, Handbook of Federal Evidence, sec. 611.3, at 515 (2nd ed. 1986)) 
When, as in this case, the defendant chooses to present evidence in her case that 
contradicts or disputes key portions of testimony of the prosecution's case in chief, the 
prosecution is entitled to produce evidence in rebuttal of every area of dispute and 
conflict within the offered testimonies. 
Contrary to Aikhionbare's assertion that, "The City's rebuttal witnesses did not 
refute the testimony of Aikhionbare's witnesses" (Defendant's Brief, p. 13), the witnesses 
did refute and disprove at every turn, much as Aikhionbare attempted to respond to the 
victim Evelyn's testimony. The use of Don Okhomina to respond to the testimony of 
Aikhionbare's witnesses was a proper use of a rebuttal case to address issues and 
testimony raised by the defense.3 
Appropriate use of rebuttal witnesses as trial strategy 
The City's use of a single witness to present its case in chief (Evelyn Okhomina) 
and subsequent use of rebuttal witnesses (Don Okhomina and Officer Rich Blanchard) to 
refute the testimony of the defendant Aikhionbare is an appropriate trial strategy. Indeed, 
the purpose of this approach is to promote an efficient trial and properly conserve judicial 
resources. 
3
 See State v. McCain, 706 P.2d 603, 607 (Utah 1985), which held that a prosecutor's use of a brief closing 
argument and then responding fully to a defendant's assertions during a rebuttal closing argument was 
proper so long as the rebuttal was limited to those matters argued by the defense. 
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At the Third District Court, Second Division, there are often numerous trials and 
motions set on a single calendar. Obviously, most of the matters set do not proceed to a 
full trial on the merits, but nevertheless, there are always issues of judicial efficiency 
whenever a trial does proceed. As a matter of trial strategy, prosecutors in this Division 
may present sufficient evidence through a single witness in a case in chief to support a 
conviction and then reserve other witnesses for rebuttal as necessary. This exercise is an 
appropriate approach to trying cases as it allows the prosecution to put forward the case 
he feels is sufficient for a conviction using as few witnesses as is necessary. 
Aikhionbare argues that Utah case law requires that the State present testimony 
corroborating the prosecutrix during one's case in chief (Defendant's Brief, p. 13, citing 
State v. Goodliffe, 578 P.2d 1288, 1290-1291 (Utah 1978)). She misreads Goodliffe. 
In that case the prosecutor attempted to admit evidence of prior complaints against 
the defendant for the purpose of rebutting the defendant's truthfulness or veracity. The 
Court held that "the clear implication of the testimony was that it was an attempt to 
demonstrate defendant's propensity to commit sexual crimes of the nature he is currently 
charged with." Id. at 1290. It was held, of course, to be inadmissible when offered only 
for that purpose. Id. 
Goodliffe, did not hold, however, that any testimony that has a corroborating 
effect on a plaintiffs witnesses or other evidence presented during a case in chief must be 
presented during that case in chief. 
In dicta only, the Court addressed the use by the prosecutor in his rebuttal case of 
a witness who corroborated his "victim's" reputation for truth and veracity as a student.4 
4
 The prosecutor called in his rebuttal case a first grade teacher who testified in support of the "victim", her 
student, and her veracity. 
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The Court observed first that the scope of rebuttal testimony is within the 
discretion of the trial court. Id. It further noted that the obvious and logical time to 
corroborate the truthfulness and veracity of a child of tender years called as a witness is 
during the prosecutor's case in chief. Id. at 1291. 
Goodliffe and its dicta regarding the order of witnesses is distinguishable by at 
least three factors. First, the City's use of rebuttal witnesses was to respond to evidence 
presented by the defense during its case. While the witnesses did corroborate the City's 
case in chief (Witness Evelyn Okhomina), that effect was incidental to the offering 
purpose of rebutting defense witnesses. There is no record in Goodliffe of the defense 
raising the issue of the witness' veracity; thus, no purpose other than corroboration exists 
for that offending witness. 
Second, the witness in Goodliffe testified only to the credibility of a child witness. 
In contrast, the City's witnesses testified to factual controversies raised by the defense. 
And third, the facts of Goodliffe are relevant to an analysis of that case. 
Specifically, the fact that the victim in that case was a five year old child makes it 
"obvious and logical" that the prosecution should have put forward evidence of the 
child's veracity in its case in chief because in cases of that type, a child witness' 
credibility is the paramount issue. 
The trial court's discretion over the mode and order of witnesses 
It is not uncommon for a trial judge acting under the discretion afforded him by 
Rule 611 to limit case in chief testimony to only that evidence that is required to sustain a 
conviction and exclude cumulative evidence until the need for it is made apparent by the 
presentation of a defendant's case. 
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The appellate court is aware that judicial caseloads demand setting multiple trials 
on a single calendar and indeed, setting more trials and motions than can possibly be 
heard. The trial court's exercise of control over the testimony it hears 
requires a delicate balancing of the goal of ascertainment of truth with the need to keep 
cases moving forward.5 
As noted in The State Trial Judge's Book, "It is the application of the rule of law 
to the facts as they are ascertained by the judicial inquiry which resolves controversies, 
and in this process, the judge must be in fact the judge."6 
II. Because the trial court properly allowed the City to present rebuttal 
witnesses, Aikhionbare's trial attorney lack of objection to such had no 
bearing on effective representation during the trial. In the alternative, the 
trial attorney failed to object to the City's use of rebuttal witnesses as part of 
a sound trial strategy whereby he argued that because of the conflicting 
testimony, a reasonable doubt must exist as to his client's guilt. 
Aikhionbare claims that the City's use of witnesses in rebuttal of her witnesses 
was improper as it allowed the City to "twice present its case in chief," (Defendant's 
brief, p. 10). Should the appellate court find either that the use was proper or the 
allowance of such was an appropriate exercise of discretion by the trial court, then this 
contingent claim of ineffective assistance of counsel for failure to object to the witnesses 
must fail. 
Standard of review 
To successfully press an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, a defendant must 
show that (i) counsel's performance was deficient in some demonstrable manner so as to 
fall below an objective standard of reasonable professional judgment, and (ii) there is a 
5
 See Federal Rules of Evidence Rule 611, Advisory Committee's Note, Release #16, 9/94, which cautions, 
"Spelling out detailed rules to govern the mode and order of interrogating witnesses and presenting 
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reasonable probability that but for the ineffective assistance, the result would have been 
more favorable to the defendant. See State v. Pascual, 804 P.2d 553, 555 (Utah Ct. App. 
1991).78 
The initial inquiry on an ineffectiveness claim as to whether or not Aikhionbare's 
trial counsel performed effectively with regard to the failure to object to the use of 
rebuttal witnesses is examined in this brief (ARGUMENT, sec. 1). 
The second prong of the Strickland test requires the defendant to show that but for 
the ineffective assistance, a more favorable outcome would have resulted. In the 
Defendant's brief at page sixteen, Aikhionbare argues that because credibility of the 
various witnesses was "of paramount concern because of the conflicting testimony," the 
trial court could have reached a different verdict without the testimony of the rebuttal 
witnesses. 
This court should note the long standing deference to a trial court's ability to 
assess issues of credibility of specific witnesses. It is clear that the trial court in his 
determination of the facts of the case, assessment of the witnesses, and examination of the 
physical evidence considered fairly and reasonably the guilt of Aikhionbare of the 
charged offense. 
In fact, Aikhionbare does not even argue in her brief that but for the alleged 
ineffectiveness, the verdict would have been more favorable. The most she can muster is 
that the trial court "could have reached a different verdict." 
evidence is neither desirable nor feasible. The ultimate responsibility for the effective working of the 
adversary system rests with the judge. The rule sets forth the objectives which he should seek to attain." 
6
 2d. Edition, West Publishing, St. Paul, Minnesota (1969). 
7
 See also Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-696 (1984). 
8
 When a trial court has heard a motion based on ineffectiveness of counsel, the appellate court affords the 
trial court's conclusions no deference but review them for correctness. The trial court's factual findings 
will be set aside only if they are clearly erroneous. See State v. Hay, 859 P.2d 1, 9, n.2 (Utah 1993). 
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In addition, it is not difficult to establish legitimate and articulable reasons for 
defendant's trial counsel's lack of objection to rebuttal witnesses. Trial counsel for the 
defense made a considered professional judgment that the rebuttal witnesses' testimony 
was appropriate for the court's consideration and believed that his witnesses were more 
credible. He also argued that because of the divergence between the two points of view 
that were presented to the trial court, a reasonable doubt as to his client's guilt must have 
existed. To pursue this theory, it was beneficial to have the City's rebuttal witnesses 
testify as they only further dramatized the vast differences in the respective witnesses' 
points of view.9 
Aikhionbare would have the appellate court reverse on the basis of ineffectiveness 
because the court's assessment on credibility, its examination of the defendant and her 
husband for truthfulness, and its consideration of the physical evidence weighed against 
the defendant. The fact that the defendant and her husband were not believed is not 
reversible error or ineffectiveness. Indeed, an examination of the trial record shows that 
the defendant's trial attorney not only performed effectively, he performed well.10 
III. The evidence was sufficient to support Aikhionbare's conviction. 
The defendant is required to marshal the facts to demonstrate that even in the light 
most favorable to the verdict- that the facts are true- they are legally insufficient to 
support a finding of guilty. An examination of the trial transcript shows the Court that 
there was sufficient evidence to find Aikhionbare guilty. 
9
 The defendant is required to overcome the strong presumption that counsel's performance fell within a 
wide range of reasonable professional assistance. See Utah v. Tennyson 850 P.2d 461,465 (Utah Ct. App. 
1993). 
10
 See State v. Medina, 738 P.2d 1021, 1023 (Utah 1987)("Decisions as to what objections to make ...are 
generally left to the professional judgment of counsel"). 
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The defendant offers the competing testimony of Aikhionbare and her husband 
Victor as "facts" that merit consideration in competition with the favorable facts 
supporting the verdict of guilty. The trial court was free to fully credit or discredit the 
testimony of these witnesses as it may in any trial, so the appellate court should offer a 
competing but discredited version no consideration. 
On the other hand, there is certainly reason to find a showing of sufficient 
evidence for conviction including the lack of injury to the Defendant Margret 
Aikhionbare to support her self defense claim, the credible testimony of the victim 
Evelyn Okhomina, and the nature of the wound sustained by Ms. Okhomina which 
indicates an offensive wound. 
CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT 
The City asks that the Court find the use of rebuttal witnesses a proper refutation 
of the defendant's witnesses or an appropriate exercise of control of the trial by the trial 
judge, find the representation of defense trial counsel effective, and find there is sufficient 
evidence to support the conviction. The City asks the Court to affirm the judgment of 
convicition. 
REQUEST FOR ORAL ARGUMENT 
Counsel certifies that this matter can be disposed of on the parties' briefs. 
SIGNED and DATED this j j ; day o f ( W * W , 1997. 
Henri Sisneros 
Assistant Prosecutor 
Salt Lake City Prosecutors Office 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that a correct copy of this Appellee's Reply Brief was mailed to Hakeem 
Ishola, counsel for the defendant on this appeal, on the Or day of Q e c e n W ; 1997. 
U^— h^MT1 
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